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FOREWORD 
This Col labora t ive  Paper i s  one of a  s e r i e s  embodying t h e  
outcome of a-workshop and conference on Economic S t r u c t u r a l  
Change: Analyt ica l  I s sues ,  held a t  I I A S A  i n  J u l y  and August 
1983. The conference and workshop formed p a r t  of t h e  con- 
t i nu ing  IIASA program on Pa t t e rn s  of Economic S t r u c t u r a l  Change 
and I n d u s t r i a l  Adjustment. 
S t r u c t u r a l  change was i n t e rp re t ed  very broadly: t h e  t o p i c s  
covered included t h e  na tu re  and causes of changes i n  d i f f e r e n t  
s e c t o r s  of t h e  world economy, t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between i n t e r -  
na t i ona l  markets and n a t i o n a l  economies, and i s s u e s  of organi- 
za t ion  and incen t ive s  i n  l a r g e  economic systems. 
There i s  a  genera l  consensus t h a t  important economic 
s t r u c t u r a l  changes a r e  occurring i n  t h e  world economy. There 
a r e ,  however, s eve ra l  a l t e r n a t i v e  approaches t o  measuring'these 
changes, t o  modeling t h e  process,  and t o  devis ing appropr ia te  
responses i n  terms of po l icy  measures and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  re- 
design. Other i n t e r e s t i n g  ques t ions  concern t h e  r o l e  of t h e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic system i n  t r ansmi t t i ng  such changes, and 
t h e  mer i t s  of a l t e r n a t i v e  modes of economic organizat ion i n  
responding t o  s t r u c t u r a l  change. A l l  of t he se  i s s u e s  were 
addressed by p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  workshop and conference, and 
w i l l  be t h e  focus of t h e  cont inuat ion of t h e  research  program's 
work. 
Geoffrey Heal 
Anatol i  Smyshlyaev 
Ern8 Zala i  
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LEGAL TENDER AND TRE VALUE OF MONEY I N  FINITE ECONOMIES* 
I. In t roduct ion  
Since the  end of the  Bretton-Woods period, with the d o l l a r  no longer 
being conver t ib le  i n t o  gold, economies have used f i a t  currencies  a s  a  
means of payment. However, t o  account formally f o r  a  r o l e  of f i a t  money 
i n  economic models tu rns  out t o  be d i f f i c u l t ;  see f o r  example Hahn 
[1965, 19821 and Wallace [1980]. To give an example of the  problems 
encountered, the model has somehow t o  exh ib i t  the  following observation 
made by Samuelson [1968]:"...one must remember the  c r u c i a l  f a c t  t h a t  M 
d i f f e r s  from every o the r  good (such a s  tea)  i n  t h a t  it  is not r e a l l y  
wanted f o r  i t s  own sake but only f o r  the  u l t imate  exchanges it  w i l l  make 
possible,"  where M s tands  f o r  cash balances. Within a Walrasian general  
equil ibrium model, money having t h i s  purpose plays no r o l e  without some 
s o r t  of add i t iona l  f r i c t i o n .  It has been widely rea l i zed  i n  the  
I 
l i t e r a t u r e  t h a t  i n  a  b a r t e r  economy t ransac t ion  cos t s ,  l i k e  the  cos t s  of 
search f o r  double coincidence of wants, could be enormous. One way t o  
introduce t r ansac t ion  cos t s  is t o  assume t h a t  exchange takes time, 
thereby reducing the  ava i l ab le  l e i s u r e  time f o r  an individual .  In a  
* 
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3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands. 
monetized economy the time spent in completing transactions can be 
reduced by using money. A transaction technology describes such a 
relation between transaction costs and cash balances; see, for example, 
Arrow and Hahn [1971, chapter 141 and Nagatani [1978, chapter 61. 
Another way to exihibit the absence of complete markets is provided by 
the Overlapping Generations Models (further OGM); see Wallace [1980]. In 
the OGM the friction is that an individual only receives an income when 
young. By holding money the individual can provide for his old age. 
Hence, cash balances are demanded and money is used because in this way 
an intrinsic friction can be partially overcome. We cite an account of 
this way of reasoning by Clower [1969, p.131: 
"...its functions as an exchange intermediary were taken over by 
warehouse receipts or by socially sanctioned issues of fiat money, Giro 
cheques, etc. Would such 'nominal' money commodities be accepted and 
used? The answer is in the affirmative. The use of money in exchange 
transaction presupposes a certain degree of organization of trading 
activity. Such organization is socially beneficial because it enables 
individuals to channel into production or leisure labour and resources 
that would otherwise have to be devoted to search..." 
An individual might realize the benefits of a monetized exchange 
economy. This, however, is not sufficient to conclude that the 
individual actually uses money in exchange. The fiat money being 
intrinsically worthless, one must be certain not to get stuck with it. 
It is necessary that other individuals also use and accept the fiat 
money as a means of payment. Even if monetized exchange is beneficial to 
all agents, an absence of trust between individuals might inhibit the 
use of fiat money; see Gale [1982, chapters 5 and 61. The next section 
provides a detailed example of this possibility. Institutional 
arrangements are needed to overcome this problem. In Clower's words 
[1969, p.131: 
"...what matters is the existence of social institutions condoned by 
either custom or law that enable individuals to trade efficiently - if 
they follow certain rules - in particular, the rule that one commodity 
traded in every exchange should be socially sanctioned as an exchange 
intermediary." 
In a way the argument is similar to the one for the provision of public 
goods. Or, as Clower [ibid., pp.14 and 151 puts it: 
"Money differs from other commodities in being universally acceptable 
as an exchange intermediary by virtue not of individual choice but 
rather by virtue of social contrivance." 
The specific institutional arrangement we are thinking of in this 
context is the notion of legal tender. The Economics Dictionary by 
Moffat [I9761 defines legal tender as: 
"Legal Tender. In the U.S., paper money and coins are designated 
legal tender; that is, when a debtor offers paper money and coins in 
settlement of a money debt, he fulfills his obligation. It is generally 
necessary that a nation give some form of money legal tender status 
because one main requirement of a money system is that it be acceptable 
by parties to a trade." 
If a fiat money is legal tender, then the individual does not have to 
worry about its intrinsic uselesnesss and its acceptability to other 
agents for his decision problem whether to hold cash balances or not. In 
our view, necessary conditions for fiat money to have positive value are 
both, that on the individual's level using money in exchange partially 
overcomes some kind of inherent friction, and that on the social level 
an institution like legal tender exists. This seems also to be Clower's 
position [ibid., p.171: 
"By virtue of these devices, practical effect is given to the 
institution of money; the establishment of organized markets enables 
individuals to channel into productive activity labour and other 
resources that would otherwise be devoted to search and bargaining 
activities. But money, as money, need not be intrinsically valuable, for 
what matters is not the particular commodity (or commodities) that serve 
as money, but rather the existence of social institutions that make 
monetary transactions feasible and efficient." 
We are not aware of any detailed or formal treatment of legal tender 
in the literature. Consider, for example, the fairly recent monographs 
on monetary economics by Niehans (19781, Nagatani (19781, Kareken and 
Wallace [ 19801 , Gale [ 19821 and Hahn [ 19821, in which the above 
described institutional aspect of money is treated rather implicitly. 
The aim of the next section is to describe how, in a model with very 
s p e c i f i c  t r a n s a c t i o n  c o s t s ,  l e g a l  tender  a r i s e s  i n  a n a t u r a l  way. 
The model d i scussed  i n  t he  next  s e c t i o n  enables  u s  t o  so lve  a problem 
which has bothered economists f o r  a while. The problem is descr ibed  
below. 
It has been argued h e u r i s t i c a l l y ,  t h a t  f i a t  money cannot have a 
p o s i t i v e  p r i c e  i n  a f i n i t e -ho r i zon  OGM under r a t i o n a l  expec ta t ions .  See 
f o r  example Bryant [1980, pp.223 and 2361, S t a r r  [1980, p.2611, Balasko 
and S h e l l  [1981, p.1131, Gale [1982, p.2261, and Hahn (1982, pp.4 and 
51. Cass and S h e l l  [1980, p.2521 formulate  t h e  argument a s  fol lows:  
"It is obvious (and well-known) t h a t  money cannot have a p o s i t i v e  
p r i c e  - t h a t  is, cannot be a s t o r e  of value - i n  t h e  convent ional  
f i n i t e -ho r i zon  model i n  which t h e  'end of t he  world' is known wi th  
c e r t a i n t y .  The reason is simple. A t  t h e  end of t h e  last per iod ,  money is  
worthless .  Therefore,  i n  t h e  next-to-last  per iod,  a l l  i n d i v i d u a l s  d e s i r e  
t o  d ispose  of money holdings i n  order  t o  avoid c a p i t a l  l o s se s .  This 
d r i v e s  t he  p r i c e  of money t o  zero a t  t h e  end of t h e  next-to-last  period. 
And so  on. Ind iv idua l s  with f o r e s i g h t ,  no t  wanting t o  be s t u c k  with t h e  
monetary ' ho t  po ta to , '  thus  d r i v e  t h e  p r i c e  of money t o  zero  i n  each 
period." 
A s  a cu re  f o r  t h i s  problem, Hahn [1982, p.51 sugges ts  t o  adopt a form 
of bounded r a t i o n a l i t y  introduced by Grandmont [1982],  i n s t e a d  of f u l l y  
r a t i o n a l  expec ta t ions .  Grandmont assumes t h a t  agents  always a t t a c h  a 
p o s i t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t o  money having a p o s i t i v e  p r i c e  i n  t h e  next  
period. This  assumption impl ies  t h a t  agents  a t t a c h  a p o s i t i v e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  t o  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  l i f e  w i l l  cont inue  forever .  One 
might stop here, because probabilities can be taken subjectively and do 
not have to be in accordance with the laws of physics. The latter 
provide a "certain" upper bound on the life of the solar system. 
The model of a monetary economy with legal tender which we develop 
below, enables us to provide a different argument for money being 
valuable in finitely lived economies. The argument is cast strictly 
whithin the structure the OGM employ. Moreover, we allow for the 
possibility that agents are aware of the final date of life with 
absolute certainty. The argument relies on the transaction-facilitating 
properties of money. In monetary OGM, like in the one of Wallace [1980], 
money functions only explicitly in the exchange between generations. It 
seems to be more natural if money is used also in exchanges between 
members of the same generation. The model set forth in the third section 
gives money a function both in inter-generational trade and in intra- 
generational trade; see Hahn [1982,p.20]. The frictions in the two sorts 
of transactions derive from the structure of the OGM. 
2. Legal Tender 
We start out to describe a simple general equilibrium exchange model 
with transaction costs. Transaction costs arise due to absence of double 
coincidence of wants. As an example, consider the following miniature 
trade model known from the works by Menger [I8921 and Wicksell [1934, 
19351. Suppose Sweden has timber for sale and sufficient corn for its 
own needs, but must buy fish. Another country, Norway, can supply fish 
and has sufficient timber, but must buy corn. Finally, Denmark has a 
surplus of corn and sufficient fish, but lacks timber. Clearly it is 
advantageous to all countries if Norway exports fish to Sweden, if 
Sweden ships an equivalent amount of timber to Denmark, while Denmark 
closes the triangle by selling corn of the same value to Norway. Assume 
the exporting firms in the three countries do not trust the importers 
abroad, then there must be quid pro quo in every transaction. Rule out 
the possiblity of payment by indirect shipments due to freight costs. It 
follows that the trade plans cannot be executed. However, the situation 
would be quite different if there existed an internationally sanctioned 
IOU. 
Wicksell's Problem has been formalized in a penetrating paper by Cass 
and Yaari [1966]. They named their model the closed-loop model, but we 
will refer to it shortly as the Ring Model (further RM). We turn to a 
precise description of the RM. 
Imagine the following, admittedly specific, economy. A finite number 
n of economic agents is arranged in a circle. Assume that agent i 
desires two goods labelled i and i+l. Agent i is able to produce these 
two goods, though he is relatively less efficient in producing good i+l 
than is his right-hand side neighbor, labelled Mr. i+l. On the other 
hand agent i has a comparative advantage in producing good i over his . 
left-hand side neighbor Mr. i-1. Suppose that Mr. i+l desires the goods 
i+l and i+2. In autarky, the its agent choice problem can be formulated 
as follows: 
Maximize 
i i+ 1 
subject to yi + fyi 1, f > 1, 
for i = l,...n, 
and where n + 1 = 1, U is common to all agents, and f > 1 indicates 
agent its comparative disadvantage in producing yi+l. Subscripts 
indicate the agent, superscripts refer to the type of commodity. Output 
is denoted by y, consumption is denoted by x. 
It can be easily deduced that it would be advantageous for all agents 
in the circle, if everybody would specialize in the production of the 
good he has an advantage in and sell it in return for the good he has a 
disadvantage in. The problem is, however, a complete absence of double 
coincidence of wants between neighbors. (It is assumed that only 
neighbors can trade.) To see this, note that Mr. i likes to buy good i+l 
from Mr. i+l, but he has nothing to offer him in return. One could say 
that the transaction costs in this model are prohibitively high. 
Suppose now that money is introduced in this economy in the way 
discussed by Cass and Yaari [1966]. Assume agent number one offers a 
promissory note to his neighbor Mr. 2, as a "payment" for the goods he 
"buys." This note  is used by M r .  2 t o  pay f o r  h i s  purchases, e tc .  It is  
understood t h a t  M r .  1 can be somehow designated a s  the  only i s s u e r  of 
money, i.e. M r .  1 functions a s  the Central  Bank. We assume t h a t  the  
Central  Bank only i s sues  a given f ixed amount of money, and t h a t  t h i s  
can be accomplished a t  no cos ts .  
Agent i ' s ,  i + 1,  choice problem can be formulated a s  follows: 
Maximize ui a dxi, i xi+l  1, 
+ < 1 f > 1, subjec t  t o  yi+ fyi 
f o r  a l l  i = 2,...,n, 
where the  p's a r e  comodi ty  pr ices ,  and m s tands  f o r  money. We assume 
t h a t  the  promissory note issued by M r .  1 is  d i v i s i b l e  and can be 
p a r t i a l l y  re ta ined by the o the r  agents. The l a t t e r  w i l l  not occur i f  we 
assume l o c a l  non-satiation. The supersc r ip t s  at tached t o  m i n d i c a t e  the  
i i  i-1 
agent from whom i t  was obtained. The r e s t r i c t i o n  p yi - m i - > 0 
i nd ica tes  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of agent i accepting cash payment i n  r e tu rn  
i for his delivery of y . On his turn, Mr i can use mi to pay for i 
i+l i+l + purchases of xi+' as shown by p yi i+lxi+l > 0. However, i - P  i 
Mr. i cannot use more money than he has in stock, i.e. m i- 1 i - mi > 0; 
recall that only the first agent has the possibility to issue money. 
We are interested in whether a monetary equilibrium exists, whether 
it constitutes an improvement over the autarky situation, and if it can 
be achieved. Cass and Yaari (19661 formulate the monetary equilibrium as 
follows : 
pi = for all i, 
yyl = 0 and yi = 1 for all i, i 
i- 1 
m i = mi for all i, i 
and x x is chosen so as to maximize lJ[x i xi+l is i 1, 
i 
subject to xi+xi+l=  i I, xi>(), xyl >0. 
It follows immediately that this equilibrium situation is weakly 
Pareto superior to the autarky situation. In game theoretic terms, the 
trade equilibrium constitutes the Nash solution. However, it is not 
immediate that this equilibrium can be attained. The process of selling 
ones goods in return for the promissory note and then buying goods by 
paying with this note, goes on until the note is offered to agent one 
from whom it originated. If the agent is truthful, he accepts the 
promissory note, but nothing in the system obliges him to do so. Put it 
di f fe r -en t ly ,  from a game t h e o r e t i c  po in t  of view t h e r e  is no i n s t i t u t i o n  
present  which enables  t h e  p layers  t o  make binding agreements. I f  agents  
r e a l i z e  t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  of d e f a u l t ,  t he  note  might never start t o  
t r a v e l  around t h e  c i r c l e  and func t ion  a s  money. 
I n  t h i s  simple economy it is p e r f e c t l y  r a t i o n a l  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  agent  
no t  t o  honor t h e  promissory note  once he has been a b l e  t o  s e l l  i t ,  cf .  
Gale 11982, p.2361. Consider t he  f i r s t  agen t ' s  choice problem: 
( 4 )  Maximize 1 2  0, = u[xl ,x l l ,  
1 2 
s u b j e c t  t o  yl + fy l  < 1, f  > 1, 
Note t h a t  t h i s  op t imiza t ion  problem d i f f e r s  from t h e  ones f o r  a l l  t h e  
o the r  agents  as descr ibed  i n  ( 2 ) ,  i n  t h a t  a c o n s t r a i n t  l i k e  
m i-l - mi > 0 is  absent .  The reasons a r e  t h a t  t he  o t h e r  agen t s  a r e  not  i i 
of fe red  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t o  i s s u e  promissory notes ,  and t h a t  they f i r s t  
have t o  ob ta in  t h e  no te  before they can use it as a means of payment. 
For a given p r i c e  vec to r  and a p o s i t i v e  demand f o r  m1 M r .  1 w i l l  always 1 ' 
choose mn = 0. What t h e  economy needs is a f i d u c i a r y  system t o  s e t t l e  1 
transactions. Therefore, besides the right for agent one to issue notes, 
the impossiblity of default by the issuer has to be guaranteed somehow. 
As a necessary condition for monetized trade in this economy with a 
complete absence of double coincidence of wants, given that agents have 
the possibility to cheat and that agents have foresight in the sense 
that they know how the economy works, we introduce the following 
institutional arrangement. 
( 5 )  Legal Tender Arrangement. All agents are offered a social 
contract. The contract transfers the right to enforce legal 
tender on any agent to an outside agency, called the 
governement. By legal tender we understand a form of payment 
which, when offered, compels a vendor to sell his commodities 
against posted prices, and compels- a creditor to accept in 
settlement of a debt1 1. Moreover, the contract designates one 
of the agents as the central banker, which means that he has 
the right to issue a fixed amount of promissory notes, called 
money. Both the enforcement of legal tender and the provision 
of money are costless. The social contract only becomes 
effective once everybody has agreed to it. 
We have constructed the Ricardian production possibilities such that 
complete specialization is advantageous to everybody, i.e. is weakly 
Pareto improving. Therefore, every agent has a strong incentive to enter 
the social contract. There are no disadvantages from entrance, because 
the institutional arrangements are assumed to be made at no costs. This 
can be altered fairly easily, but the no-costs assumption seems to be in 
accordance with the prevailing view that the provision of money is 
essentially costless. 
The monetized exchange process can now be described as a cooperative 
game in which the legal tender arrangement is the binding agreement. The 
complete specialization solution constitutes the Nash solution. For a 
more detailed treatment of the game theoretic approach to monetary 
economics the reader is asked to consult Dubey and Shubik [1977], Shubik 
[I9811 and Gale [19821. 
The bargaining process we envision is such that an auctioneer first 
establishes an equilibrium price list. Once established, each agent 
posts prices for the goods he is willing to sell and trade can proceed 
in a decentralized way. The legal tender arrangement is brought out by 
the following condition 
Condition ( 6 )  says that Mr. 1, the central banker, has to accept cash 
n 1 payments m by Mr. n for his sales of x1 against the posted price p , 1 
because money is legal tender. Note that Mr. 1 realizes that 
n n 1 
m = m C ml, because he is the only one issuing money. Therefore, ( 6 )  1 n 
implies in a monetary equilibrium that Mr. 1's balance of trade is zero. 
The claim, mi-'= mi for all i, in the characterization of the monetary 
equilibrium (3) is now substaniated by condition ( 6 ) .  We are guaranteed 
that when the promissory note travels around the circle, it will be 
accepted by the original issuer for payments of purchases by the other 
agents. 
In most general equilibrium models some kind of auctioneer and 
clearing house activities are assumed to exist. The auctioneer 
establishes the equilibrium price after which contracts for deliveries 
are finalized. The clearing house collects all the offered commodities 
and redistributes them according to the contracts. In this way the 
clearing house overcomes the problem of cheating present in the above 
model. In the model laid out, we implicitly assumed that the clearing 
house activities are more costly than the implementation of legal 
tender. There is no a priori reason why this should be the case, it is 
merely an empirical question. 
The arrangement of legal tender derives its plausibility from the 
following two facts. First, it renders the monetary system its fidelity 
by overcoming the problem of individual default to which the society is 
liable. Second, it is compatible with individual choice . By this we 
mean that, depending on the transaction costs structure inherent to the 
economy, monetized trade only develops if it brings about a weak Pareto 
improvement, i.e. legal tender is not imposed. We feel that our 
arrangement is preferable to others which have been put forward to 
render fiat money valuable. Clower's 119671 constraint requires that 
only money can buy goods. But this assumes what should be explained, see 
Hahn [1982, p.211. Clearly our RM allows for barter equilibria. The use 
of money is not imposed without the individual's consent. Money will be 
used only if it has a function, i.e. if its use overcomes some intrinsic 
friction. Two other devices have been put forward in the literature, 
being the Hahn [I9711 constraint and the Grandmont [I9821 assumption, 
see Starr [1980]. As a discussion thereof is more appropriate within a 
dynamic model, we postpone the discussion to the next section in which 
such a model is developed. 
3. The Value of Money in Finite Economies 
We expect that the legal tender constraint (6) is present but not 
apparent to the individual during normal times. Only during times of 
extreme social upheaval, like in the period immediately preceding a 
currency reform or during the last days of the world, one expects legal 
tender to have relevance. Therefore, we develop a dynamic model in which 
legal tender normally plays only a latent role, and in which it becomes 
active during, say, "the last period of the world." This dynamic model 
is then used to discuss the value of money problem in finitely lived 
economies. 
The model we have in mind derives its dynamic structure from the OGM. 
Transaction costs in intra-generational trade stem form the RM 
structure. Before we turn to a description of the model, we review 
another approach. Alternative to or complementary to the transaction 
costs present in the RM discussed above, are the search and bargaining 
costs indicated by the leisure time forgone. To give money its 
transaction function, one imposes a relationship between money and 
leisure time. Money facilitates transactions by reducing the leisure 
time needed to accomplish exchange. Such a relationship might be taken 
as primitive as is the utility function in consumer theory or the 
production function in the theory of the firm. For the plausibility of a 
direct relation between money and leisure time one might appeal to the 
articles by Clower [1969], by Jones [I9761 and by Alchian [1977]. A n  
example of this approach can be found in Arrow and Hahn [1971, chapter 
141. It has been shown2) that this approach overcomes many of the 
unlikely properties the Monetary OGM, like the one of Wallace [1980], 
exhibit. However, the proponents of the Monetary OGM (further MOGM) to 
study the role of money might rebuke that the money-leisure time 
relationship has been assumed and has to be explained. The appeal to the 
articles of Clower, Jones and Alchian as arguments for the way in which 
to describe the relationship between money and leisure time, might not 
convince proponents of MOGM. We could be accused of "implicit 
theorizing3)," see Kareken and Wallace 11980, p.21. Therefore, we will 
model the transaction frictions explicitly. Moreover, we will use the 
same sort of friction as exists between periods, thereby staying within 
the realms of the MOGM proponents. 
The Cass and Shell [I9801 argument for studying infinite-horizon 
economies is a two-step procedure. First they argue that if money does 
not serve as a store of value, then it cannot serve any other useful 
function. After which they give the reason for studying infinite-horizon 
economies; see the quotation in section 1. Our model shows that even if 
the store of value function of money is absent in the last period, money 
still can have value because it accomplishes double coincidence of wants 
between the agents trading in the last period. To establish this, we 
marry the OGM of Samuelson with the RM of Cass and Yaari. The 
transaction frictions we propose to study are twofold. On one hand we 
study those stemming from the trade between generations in the well- 
known MOGM. On the other hand, we will assume that agents within one 
period also trade with their own generation members according to the RM 
structure, thereby introducing transaction frictions within a period. A 
formal desrciption of the model is as follows. 
Agents of each generation live for two periods. When young, they 
t i  
consume three goods xi(t), txi+l(t) and tz:(t). When old, the i-th i 
i agent only desires the zi type good. Thus, the z good is consumed at 
any time by both, one of the younger generation and one of the older 
generation. (One could think of these agents having a parent-child 
relation. ) The agent maximizes his utility function 
where : 
superindices t denote the generation the agent belongs to; 
superindices i and i+l denote the type of commodity; 
subscripts i denote the agent; 
index t within brackets denotes the period of consumption; 
tx:(t) and xi+' ( t ) denote the consumption levels of the perishable i 
commodities; 
t i  tzi(t) and zi(t+l) denote the consumption levels of the storable i 
commodi ty . 
We assume that the x type goods are perishable over time, and cannot 
be shipped during any period by agents other than the ones who desire 
it. In the RM of the previous section only x type goods were present. 
The good z, desired in both periods, is the one common to all OGM. This 
good can be stored to provide for consumption in the last period, but it 
depreciates during storage. Agent i possesses the following production 
and storage capacities: 
where : 
t i  y ( t )  i n d i c a t e s  the  production of x i ( t ) ;  
tyyl ( t )  i n d i c a t e s  the production of xi+'(t) ; 
t i  
q i ( t )  i n d i c a t e s  the  production of r i ( t ) ;  
t q ( t + l )  i n d i c a t e s  the  production of zi( t+l) .  
The c o e f f i c i e n t  f  i n d i c a t e s  agent i 's  comparative disadvantage i n  the  
production of the  ( i+ l ) - th  good. The c o e f f i c i e n t  d r ep resen t s  t he  
deprec ia t ion  of zi due t o  s torage.  
The outcome of t h e  ind iv idua l  choice problem under au tarky  i s  
described by maximizing (7)  sub jec t  t o  (8). To enhance t r ade ,  suppose 
t h a t  a t  some d a t e  an ou t s ide  agency i s s u e s ,  a t  no c o s t s ,  nowredeemable 
notes  t o  the  e lde r ly .  The then young might want t o  exchange some of the 
s t o r a b l e  commodity f o r  these  notes  t o  make t r a d e  wi th  t h e i r  own 
genera t ion  members f e a s i b l e ,  and t o  r e s e l l  t hese  notes  f o r  t h e  s t o r a b l e  
commodity when o ld ,  t o  overcome depreciat ion.  A t  t h e  same time a s  the  
money is issued,  a l l  members of t he  two genera t ions  are of fe red  a s o c i a l  
c o n t r a c t  f o r  t he  enforcement of l e g a l  tender.  Each period,  the  s o c i a l  
c o n t r a c t  has t o  be agreed upon anew. For s impl i c i ty ,  we assume t h a t  t h e  
young genera t ions  cannot i s s u e  t h e i r  own currency. Thus, they e i t h e r  
have t o  use t h e  money suppl ied  by the  e l d e r l y  o r  s t i c k  t o  ba r t e r .  
Assume the  fol lowing t r ad ing  scheme t o  e x i s t  wi th in  a period,  i f  
t he re  is  any t r a d e  a t  all .  Before t r a d e  takes  place,  an  equi l ibr ium 
p r i c e  l is t  is es t ab l i shed  by the  auct ioneer .  We assume aga in  t h a t  
i nd iv idua l s  are f u l l y  aware of t he  s t r u c t u r e  of the  model. F i r s t  t r ade  
between the  o ld  and the  young takes  place,  then t r a d e  between t h e  
members of the  same genera t ion  is conducted. 
I f  agent i decides t o  hold cash balances and t o  s ign the s o c i a l  
contrac t ,  he f i r s t  engages i n t o  trade with the elderly.  The exchange 
cons t ra in t  f o r  t h i s  t ransact ion reads 
where s i ( t )  i s  the  p r i ce  of z i ( t ) ,  and "'mi(t) i s  the amount of money i 
obtained from the e l d e r l y  i n  re turn  f o r  a  par t  of the  production 
tq i ( t ) .  This exchange cons t ra in t  describes the  r e s t r i c t i o n  on the  demand i 
f o r  money by the young. However, because money is l e g a l  tender there  is 
a l s o  a supply cons t ra in t  present 
This l a t t e r  cons t ra in t  says tha t  the  young a r e  obliged t o  s e l l  z i ( t )  
when they a r e  offered money m i t ,  vide our d e f i n i t i o n  of l e g a l  i 
tender i n  (5) .  
After  t h i s ,  agent i engages in to  exchange with M r .  i+l and M r .  i-1 of 
h i s  generation. From agent i+l, agent i can purchase good xi+' agains t  
p r i ce  pi+1. The purchase r e s t r i c t i o n  reads 
i M r .  i-1 on h i s  tu rn  purchases txi from M r .  i agains t  pr ice  p , i n  r e tu rn  
f o r  tmi-l. Agent it s s a l e  r e s t r i c t i o n  reads 
By our assumption, money is l ega l  tender and agent i has t o  accept cash 
t i  payments hi-' by M r .  i-1 f o r  s a l e s  of xi. Formally, l e g a l  tender can 
be expressed by the r e s t r i c t i o n  
Condition (13) can be formulated d i f fe ren t ly .  Notice t h a t ,  given the  
p r i ce  l e v e l ,  condit ions (11) and (12) leave open the amount of money 
used i n  intra-generat ional  trade. This is so because the  model leaves 
the  ve loc i ty  of money unspecified. I f  fo r  example the  p r i ce  l e v e l  is  
high and the  amount of money obtained from the  e l d e r l y  is  low, then 
t o t a l  purchases of a commodity can be ef fec ted  i n  more than one 
transaction.  This p o s s i b i l i t y  a r i s e s  because we disregard the t i m e  
needed f o r  purchase and payment. In  pr inciple ,  a l l  t ransact ions  could be 
ef fec ted  with the same coin, cf. Wicksell [1935, p.181. This begs the 
question a s  t o  why the  young i n  "the l a s t  period of the world" a r e  
wi l l ing  t o  hold some useless  f i a t  money, i.e. why the currency notes 
w i l l  not c i r c l e  around indef in i t e ly .  The reason t h a t  t h i s  does not occur 
is  a s  follows. Suppose an optimal a l loca t ion  has been achieved and t h a t  
agent i buys some e x t r a  txi+l from M r .  i+l i n  r e tu rn  f o r  some tmi. Agent 
( i + l ) ' s  pos i t ion  d e t o r i a t e s ,  but he can recapture par t  of h i s  i n i t i a l  
prosper i ty  by spending the  e x t r a  amount of money received on txi+2. I n  
the  end, agent i 's neighbor M r .  i-1 w i l l  purchase some txi, thereby 
de to r ia t ing  agent i 's pos i t ion  with respect  t o  the i n i t i a l  a l locat ion.  
The upshot of t h i s  s t o r y  is, tha t  it is  r a t i o n a l  f o r  every agent t o  s top 
purchasing once the  optimal a l loca t ion  has been reached, because i n  the  
end the extra money spend will come back to the initial spender. In 
other words, it is rational for all agents to pursue a "Tit for Tat" 
strategy, see Hofstadter [1983]. To capture this idea, condition (13) is 
reformulated as a reaction function: 
t i  
where dr/d mi(t) = 1. Equation (14) says that one can expect to receive 
an amount of money from ones neighbor i-1 equal to the amount one spends 
on xi+' purchased from the other neighbor. 
During the next period t+l, the now old agent i can exchange his 
currency holdings '-lm:(t+l), which were obtained from the elderly in 
the previous period, with the then young in return for zi( t+l). His 
second period budget constraint reads 
During normal times, when constraint (15) is operative, conditions 
(10) and (13) are automatically satisfied, because it is rational for 
the young to provide for their old age by holding cash balances. In this 
way storage inefficiences due to depreciation can be overcome. However, 
once the last period of the world has come, condition (15) is 
irrelevant. At this stage the legal tender restrictions (10) and (14) 
become active4). Whether agents are willing to enter the social contract 
in the last period depends on the transaction costs inherent to the 
RM structure, just like in the previous section, in combination with the 
costs incurred by obtaining the money from the old generation. 
Agent i's choice problem under the regime of monetized exchange is to 
maximize his utility function (7) subject to his transformation 
possibilities (8), the exchange constraints (9), (ll), (12), and (15), 
and the legal tender restrictions (10) and (14). Whether a monetary 
equilibrium exists if the economy is finitely lived will be discussed 
shortly. First, we like to settle whether money in our model can be 
designated as fiat money, and we want to return to the discussion at the 
end of the previous section. 
Wallace [I9801 defines fiat money as having the qualities of being 
intrinsically useless and of being inconvertible. If we translate 
intrinsic uselessness by the requirement that money is not an argument 
of any agent's utility function, then our model clearly satisfies this 
requirement. Inconvertibility means that the issuer does not promise to 
convert the money into anything else. From the setup of the monetary 
system it is clear that the notes which circulate as money are non- 
redeemable. 
We are now in a position to come back to' the discussion of the 
reasonableness of the legal tender arrangement in relation to other 
institutions which have been put forward in the literature. The Hahn 
[I9711 constraint requires agents to pay fixed money sums to the 
government at the final date. In our model agents do not have to hold 
money for this purpose. The Hahn restriction "imposes free disposal" 
upon individuals, because agents have to give up something for nothing. 
In the model outlined above, individuals only choose to hold money if 
they can acquire something more valuable in return. With respect to the 
Grandmont [I9821 assumption, legal tender, together with the RM 
structure, explains why agents attach positive probabilities to money 
having value a t  each conceivable fu ture  date. A somewhat d i f f e r e n t  
approach is taken by Dubey and Shubik [I9771 and by Shubik [1981]. They 
assume t h a t  individuals  can obtain f i a t  money from an outs ide  agency 
through competitive bidding with personal I O U  notes. These I O U  notes 
must be redeemed a f t e r  t rade ,  and t h i s  is guaranteed by a d e f a u l t  
penalty added t o  the  individual ' s  u t i l i t y  function. It seems t h a t  Dubey 
and Shubikfs approach is i n  essence the  one taken by Hahn. 
Final ly ,  we face  the  question whether the re  e x i s t s  a monetary 
equilibrium i n  our model. By a monetary equilibrium w e  w i l l  understand 
the  existence of a p r i ce  vector  which c l e a r s  a l l  markets, and which 
contains p o s i t i v e  p r i ces  f o r  money a t  some dates.  With r a t i o n a l  
expectat ions the  c r u c i a l  questlon is whether money has a pos i t ive  pr ice  
during the l a s t  period. This depends on whether o r  not the  young i n  the  
f i n a l  period have a pos i t ive  demand f o r  cash balances. 
It is  i n t u i t i v e l y  c l e a r  t h a t  the young w i l l  hold cash balances i f  the 
gain  i n  spec ia l i za t ion  i n  the  production of the  perishable goods 
outweighs the  l o s s  of consumption i n  the  s to rab le  good. Money is 
necessary t o  induce agents t o  spec ia l i ze  i n  the  production of the 
perishable goods. Put it d i f f e r e n t l y ,  t rade  i n  the  perishable goods is  
not possible without money because of the  absence of double coincidence 
of wants. The l e g a l  tender assumption, however, guarantees t h a t  agents 
accept cash payments t o  settle debts. 
Suppose t h a t  agent i f s  u t i l i t y  function takes the  form 
where we have omitted indices  i f  no confusion is possible. The 
.transformation restrictions read 1 - - 2yy1 > 0, and " i 
i 1 - qi - 2q (1) > 0. The exchange restrictions are as specified above. i i 
The last period's young agent maximizes 
i i 
ui = In x + In xi+' + In zi. The production restrictions for these i i 
agents are 1 - i 
" i - zyY1 > 0, and 1 - tq: > 0. In autarky, the last 
i i 1 i+l 1 period's young choose z = 1 x i  and x = 7. Suppose now that the i 2 ' i 
elderly offer one unit of money, and suppose that the prevailing price 
vector is (p i,pi+l ,si) = (3,3,3). Then it follows that the young agent i 
i i+l zi mi) has a demand vector (x x 1 1 2  is i ' i' = ( ,  2,  J ,  1 ) . In this case money 
has a positive price and the young are better of than in autarky. It is 
easy to check that at this price vector all markets clear, and one can 
show that the demand vector maximizes the agent's utility function given 
the price vector. Thus, the posted price vector is an equilibrium price 
vector. If desired, one can continue this example by studying the period 
preceding the final period. By choosing the price vector 
( P i,pi+l,si,si(t+l)) = (2,2,2,3), one can show again that this is an 
equilibrium price vector, and that it is in accordance with the one 
prevailing in the last period. Again, money is valuable and everybody is 
better off with respect to the autarky situation. Note the rise in 
prices which occurs in the last period. 
Notes 
1) Note that we have broadened the definition of legal tender by Moffat 
that was stated in section 1. The motivation for our definition is 
based upon how the civil code circumscribes the exchange process. To 
take one example, according to the Dutch law any exchange consists 
of two stages. First, the agreement to exchange has to be 
established. The second stage involves the fulfillment of the 
agreement. The establishment of an agreement is conditional upon the 
consent by both parties and some other conditions, like the legality 
of the subject of the agreement. The fulfillment of the agreement is 
achieved by delivery and payment. According to the interpretation of 
the Dutch law: in case a vendor posts prices it is understood that 
the consent for the agreement to exchange is already given by him. 
If a purchaser expresses the desire to purchase a given quantity 
against posted prices, then, according to the Dutch law, an 
agreement to exchange is said to be established. Hence, the 
obligation by both parties to fulfill the commitments of the 
agreement exists. The agreement is fulfilled whence delivery has 
taken place and payment is offered to the vendor. The vendor has to 
accept payment in legal tender notes in settlement of the agreement. 
From an economic point of view it is irrelevant to distinguish 
between the two stages of an agreement. In our definition of legal 
tender we combine the two stages by simply assuming that a vendor 
posts prices, established by the auctioneer, for the goods he is 
willing to sell, and that he is obliged to sell these goods upon an 
offer of money when it is designated legal tender by the social 
contract . 
2) For reference, see Hahn [1980], McCallum [I9821 and De Vries [1982]. 
3)  We still feel that a relationship between leisure time and money 
might be taken as a primitive assumption. 
4 )  The definition of the Legal Tender Arrangement (5), which was 
designed for the RM, has to be made fit for the dynamic model. The 
l e g a l  tender  notes  a r e  no longer  promissory notes ,  they a r e  non- 
redeemable notes  which were issued t o  the e l d e r l y  by an  ou t s ide  
agency sometime i n  the  past .  I n  the  RM the  arrangement had only 
relevance f o r  t h e  exchange between the n-th and the  f i r s t  agent. In  
the dynamic model, however, it is  of d i r e c t  importance t o  every 
young agent i n  the  l a s t  period. By our d e f i n i t i o n  of l e g a l  tender ,  
vendors a r e  compelled t o  s e l l  commodities a g a i n s t  posted p r i c e s  when 
they a r e  of fered  l e g a l  tender  notes.  Therefore,  once t h e  s o c i a l  
con t r ac t  is agreed upon i n  the  l a s t  period,  the  young ones a r e  
w i l l i n g  t o  sel l  t h e i r  commodities and t o  accept  i n  r e t u r n  t h e  
wor th less  l e g a l  tender  notes.  The young agents  r e a l i z e  t h a t  they 
w i l l  end up wi th  holding some of these  i n t r i n s i c a l l y  wor th less  
notes ;  but ,  they r e a l i z e  a t  the same time t h a t  i n  t h i s  way they can 
capture  the  ga ins  from trade.  
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